Abstract. Hypersequent and labelled calculi are often viewed as antagonist formalisms to define cut-free calculi for non-classical logics. We focus on the class of intermediate logics to investigate the methods of turning Hilbert axioms into hypersequent rules and frame conditions into labelled rules. We show that these methods are closely related and we extend them to capture larger classes of intermediate logics.
Introduction
The lack of cut-free sequent calculi for logics having natural semantic characterizations and/or simple axiomatizations has prompted the search for generalizations of the Gentzen sequent framework. Despite the large variety of formalisms introduced in the literature (see e.g., [17] ), there are two main approaches. In the syntactic approach sequents are generalized by allowing extra structural connectives in addition to sequents' comma; in the semantic approach the semantic language is explicit part of the syntax in sequents and rules.
Hypersequent calculus [2] is a prominent example of the syntactic approach, while labelled calculi internalizing Kripke semantics [15, 8, 16, 10] are the most developed systems within the semantic approach. Hypersequent and labelled calculus are general-purpose formalisms powerful enough to capture logics of a different nature ranging from modal to substructural logics [8, 16, 10, 3] , and are often viewed as antagonist formalisms to define cut-free calculi.
In this paper we focus on propositional intermediate logics, i.e. logics between intuitionistic and classical logic, in order to analyze and compare the methods in [7, 5] for defining cut-free hypersequent and labelled calculi. Intermediate logics are an adequate case study for two reasons: (i) Although most of them have a simple axiomatization obtained by extending intuitionistic logic IL with suitable axioms, and have a natural Kripke semantics defined by imposing conditions on the standard intuitionistic frame, corresponding cut-free sequent calculi cannot be defined in a modular way by simply extending the Gentzen sequent calculus LJ for IL with new axioms or rules, see [5] . (ii) Cut-free hypersequent and labelled systems have been provided for a large class of intermediate logics in a modular and algorithmic way in [5, 7] . The resulting calculi are indeed defined by ⋆ Work supported by FWF START Y544-N23.
adding to the base (hypersequent or labelled) calculus for IL extra structural rules corresponding to the additional conditions characterizing the considered logic. The extra rules are constructed in an algorithmic way by turning Hilbert axioms into hypersequent rules [5] and by turning frame conditions -that are formulas of first-order classical logic-into labelled rules [7] . The main differences between these methods are their starting point (syntactic vs. semantic specifications of the considered logics) and their approach: systematic, i.e. based on a syntactic classification of Hilbert axioms in the case of hypersequents, and presenting a specific class of frame conditions (called geometric formulas) for which the method works, in the case of labelled sequents.
In this paper we analyze both methods and refine the approach in [5] (and [6] ) to introduce new cut-free calculi for intermediate logics. For hypersequents: we define a first cut-free hypersequent calculus for the logic Bd 2 [4] , one of the seven interpolable intermediate logics and the only one still lacking a cutfree hypersequent calculus. Our calculus is obtained by adapting the method in [6] to extract a logical hypersequent rule out of the peculiar axiom of Bd 2 , and then modifying the obtained rule to make the cut-elimination go through. For labelled sequents: we classify frame conditions according to their quantifier alternation and apply to them the algorithm in [5] ; the rules resulting from geometric formulas coincide with those obtained by the method in [7] .
Preliminaries
The language of propositional intermediate logics consists of infinitely many propositional variables p, q . . . , the connectives & (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ⊃ (implication), and the constant ⊥ for falsity. ϕ, ψ, α, β . . . are formulas built from atoms by using connectives and ⊥. As usual, ∼ ϕ abbreviates ϕ ⊃ ⊥.
An intuitionistic frame is a pair F = W, where W is a non-empty set, and is a reflexive and transitive (accessibility) relation on W . An intuitionistic model M = F, is a frame F together with a relation (called the forcing) between elements of W and atomic formulas. Intuitively, x p means that the atom p is true at x. Forcing is assumed to be monotonic w.r.t. the relation , namely, if x y and x p then also y p. It is defined inductively on arbitrary formulas as follows:
x ⊥ for no x x ϕ&ψ iff x ϕ and x ψ x ϕ ∨ ψ iff x ϕ or x ψ x ϕ ⊃ ψ iff x y and y ϕ implies y ψ Intermediate logics are obtained from intuitionistic logic IL either by (i) adding suitable axioms to the Hilbert system for IL or (ii) imposing on intuitionistic frames additional conditions on the relation . The latter conditions are usually expressed as formulas of first-order classical logic CL in which variables are interpreted as elements of W , and the binary predicate denotes the accessibility relation of F. Atomic formulas are relational atoms of the form x y. Compound formulas are built from relational atoms using the propositional connectives ∧, ∨, →, ¬, and the quantifiers ∀ and ∃. 
Logic

Axioms
Frame conditions
Hypersequent and labelled calculi. Introduced by Avron in [2] , the hypersequent calculus is a simple generalization of Gentzen's sequent calculus whose basic objects are finite disjunctions of sequents. A hypersequent calculus is defined by incorporating Gentzen's original calculus (e.g., LJ, LK or a substructural version of it) as a sub-calculus and adding an additional layer of information by considering a single sequent to live in the context of hypersequents. This opens the possibility to define new rules that "exchange information" between different sequents. This type of rule increases the expressive power of hypersequent calculi compared to ordinary sequent calculi and allows us to capture the characteristic axioms of several intermediate logics.
Labelled systems are a variant of sequent calculus in which the relational semantics of the formalized logics is made explicit part of the syntax [8, 16, 10] . In a labelled system, each formula ϕ receives a label x, indicated by x : ϕ. The labels are interpreted as possible worlds, and a labelled formula x : ϕ corresponds to x ϕ. Moreover, labels may occur also in expressions for accessibility relation (relational atoms) like, e.g., x y of intuitionistic and intermediate logics.
Definition 2.
A labelled sequent is a sequent consisting of labelled formulas and relational atoms. Table 1 depicts the labelled calculus G3I for IL. Note that its logical rules are obtained directly from the inductive definition of forcing. The rule R ⊃ must satisfy the eigenvariable condition (y does not occur in the conclusion). The structural rules Ref and T rans for relational atoms correspond to the assumptions of reflexivity and transitivity of in F.
Hypersequent Calculi for Intermediate Logics
It was shown in [5] how to transform a large class of Hilbert axioms into structural hypersequent rules in a systematic way. This allowed for the automated definition of cut-free hypersequent calculi for a large class of (substructural) logics. In the case of intermediate logics, the transformation in [5] works for all axioms within the class P 3 of the classification (substructural hierarchy) defined Table 1 . Labelled calculus G3I for IL [7] by the following grammar 3 based on the (propositional) language of LJ: N 0 , P 0 contain the set of atomic formulas.
The classes P n and N n contain axioms with leading positive and negative connective, respectively. A connective is positive (negative) if its left (right) logical rule is invertible [1] ; note that in the sequent calculus LJ, ∨ is positive, ⊃ is negative and & is both positive and negative.
Example 2. The axioms (lin), (wc) and (em) in Example 1 are within the class P 3 . The corresponding hypersequent rules can be generated using the PROLOGsystem AxiomCalc, which implements the algorithm in [5] and is available at http://www.logic.at/people/lara/axiomcalc.html.
Theorem 1 ([5]).
Given an axiom A ∈ P 3 , the rules generated by the algorithm in [5] are sound and complete for the intermediate logic IL+A and they preserve cut elimination when added to the hypersequent version of LJ.
Extending the Method -a Case Study
Not all axioms defining intermediate logics are within the class P 3 . For instance, (bd 2 ) (i.e. ξ ∨ (ξ ⊃ (ϕ ∨ (ϕ ⊃ ψ)))) is in P 4 and cannot be transformed into an equivalent structural rule using the procedure in [5] . In this section we show how to combine a heuristic method with the procedure in [5] (in fact, its classical and multiple-conclusion version in [6] ) to introduce a logical rule for (bd 2 ). We present ad-hoc proofs of soundness, completeness and cut elimination for the resulting calculus. Inspired by [14] we use as base calculus (the hypersequent version of) Maehara's calculus LJ' for intuitionistic logic, see [13] . This is a multiple-conclusion version of LJ where the intuitionistic restriction, i.e., the consequent of a sequent contains at most one formula, applies only to the right rule of ⊃ (and ∀, in the first order case). The rule schemas for the hypersequent version of LJ' (we call this calculus HLJ') are depicted in Table 2 . Note that Γ, Σ, Π, ∆ stand for multisets of formulas while G and H denote hypersequents.
The calculus HBd 2 is obtained by extending HLJ' with the following rule:
A careful application of the transformation steps of the procedure in [6] to the axiom ξ ∨ (ξ ⊃ (ϕ ∨ (ϕ ⊃ ψ))) yields a similar rule (we call it (bd 2 )') with ψ not occurring in the premise. Indeed by using the invertible rules of HLJ' ((⊃, r) is when
which is easily seen to be inter-derivable in HLJ' with the following rule:
The rule (bd 2 )' is then obtained by applying cut to the premises
but it has no cut-free proof. The rule (bd 2 ) * was obtained by a last heuristic step: by inspecting the counterexample for cut admissibility and changing the rule (bd 2 )' accordingly.
We show that HBd 2 is sound and complete for the logic Bd 2 .
, and ∆ i is the disjunction of the formulas in ∆ i (⊥ when ∆ i is empty).
The height |d| of a derivation d is the maximal number of inference rules + 1 occurring on any branch of d. The principal formula of a logical rule is the compound formula introduced in the conclusion. Formulas, which remain unchanged by a rule application, are referred to as contexts. Henceforth we use ⊢ S ϕ (or ⊢ S Γ ⇒ ∆, or ⊢ S G) to denote that a formula ϕ (a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, or a hypersequent G) is derivable in the calculus S.
Theorem 2 (Soundness and Completeness). For any sequent
I . By induction on the height of a derivation of G. The base case (G is an initial sequent) is easy. For the inductive case it suffices to see that for each inference rule in HBd 2 with premise(s) G 1 (and G 2 ), the sequent G
The only non-trivial case to show is (bd 2 ) * :
that follows by a (cut) with the axiom (bd 2 ), i.e.,
The rules of LJ are derivable in HBd 2 . A proof of the axiom (bd 2 ) is:
The cut elimination proof for the calculus HBd 2 requires a special strategy. It proceeds by cases according to the cut formula. For non-atomic cut formulas having & and ∨ as outermost connective, we use the invertibility of the rules to replace the cut by smaller ones.
Cut formulas having ⊃ as outermost connective require a different handling. In this case we proceed by shifting the cut upwards in a specific order: First we move the cut upwards in the right derivation d r which has the cut formula on the right side of the sequent (Lemma 2). If the cut formula is introduced by (⊃, r) or (bd 2 ) * we proceed by shifting the cut upwards in the left derivation d l until the cut formula is introduced and finally cut the premises to replace the cut by smaller ones (Lemma 1). Moving the cut upwards can indeed be problematic in presence of (⊃, r) or (bd 2 ) * in d l . E.g., in the following situation:
The reason being the presence of the context ∆ that does not permit the subsequent application of (⊃, r) to the following derivation
However, it is always possible to shift the cut upward over d l when the cut formula in the right premise is introduced by a rule (⊃, r) or (bd 2 )
* . For instance, in the above case assume that
* rule whose premises are
The original cut above is shifted upwards as follows (we omit the contexts G and H for simplicity):
The complexity |ϕ| of a formula ϕ is defined as usual:
We use the following notation where ϕ is a formula and Σ is a multiset of 
Then we can find a derivation
Proof. By induction on |d l |. If |d l | ends in an axiom, we are done. Otherwise, consider the last inference rule (R) applied in |d l |. Suppose that (R) acts only on H, or (R) is any rule other than (⊃, l) introducing α ⊃ β, (⊃, r), or (bd 2 ) * . Then the claim follows by applications of the inductive hypothesis, (R) and, if needed, weakening and contraction. When (R) = (⊃, l) and α ⊃ β is the principal formula the claim follows by applying the inductive hypothesis and subsequent cuts with cut formulas α and β.
The only interesting cases arise when (R) is (⊃, r) or (bd 2 )
* .When d r ends in an application of (⊃, r), the required derivation is simply obtained by applying the inductive hypothesis and (R) (note that in this case ∆ is empty and hence no context is added to the premises by the inductive hypothesis).
If d r ends with (bd 2 ) * and (R) = (⊃, r) the case is handled as described on the previous page. Assume that d r ends with (bd 2 ) * and (R) = (bd 2 ) * as in the following derivation (we omit the contexts for simplicity):
where Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ ′ |Γ ⇒ α ⊃ β, ∆ is the conclusion of a (bd 2 ) * rule with premises
The cut is moved upwards as follows:
Lemma 2 (Shift Right). Let d l and d r be derivations in HBd 2 such that:
-d l is a derivation of H | Σ, ϕ ⇒ Π, -ϕ is either atomic or of the form α ⊃ β, -d r is a derivation of G | Γ 1 ⇒ ϕ n1 , ∆ 1 | · · · | Γ k ⇒ ϕ n k , ∆ k , -ρ(d l ) ≤ |ϕ| and ρ(d r ) ≤ |ϕ|.
Then we can find a derivation
Proof. By induction on |d r |. If |d r | ends in an axiom, we are done. Otherwise, consider the last inference rule (R) in |d r |. If (R) acts only on G or (R) is any rule other than a logical rule introducing ϕ then the claim follows by applications of the inductive hypothesis, (R) and, if needed, weakening or contraction. If (R) is (⊃, r) or (bd 2 ) * and ϕ is the principal formula. The claim follows by applications of the inductive hypothesis, the corresponding rule (R) and Lemma 1. 
Theorem 3 (Cut elimination). Cut elimination holds for
Labelled Calculi for Intermediate Logics
A methodology to define cut-free labelled calculi for a large class of intermediate logics is contained in [7, 10] . The resulting calculi are obtained by adding to the labelled intuitionistic system G3I (see Table 1 ) new structural rules, corresponding to the peculiar frame conditions of the considered logics.
The (formulas defining) frame conditions, to which the method in [7] applies, are called geometric formulas. These consist of conjunctions of formulas of the form ∀x(
, where x, y are sequences of bound variables, each P i is a relational atom, each M j is a conjunction of relational atoms Q j1 , . . . , Q j k and y does not appear in P 1 , . . . , P m . If y does not appear in M i (for all i = 1, . . . , n) the resulting formula is called a universal axiom. As shown in [7] , the rule scheme corresponding to geometric formulas has the form
where each Q j is the multiset of Q j1 , . . . , Q j k and z 1 , . . . , z n are eigenvariables (i.e. variables not occurring in the conclusion). The accessibility relation in all intermediate logics of Example 1 is characterized by universal or geometric axioms.
Theorem 4 ([7]). Cut is admissible in any extension of G3I by rules of the form (geom). Weakening and contraction are height-preserving (hp-) admissible, i.e. whenever their premises are derivable, so is their conclusion with at most the same derivation height. All rules are hp-invertible.
Henceforth we will use P, Q, . . . 
Towards a Systematic Approach
Inspired by the algorithms in [5, 6] for hypersequent calculi, we provide a systematic method to transform a large class of frame conditions for intermediate logics into labelled rules. Soundness, completeness and cut-elimination are proved for the generated calculi, that in the case of geometric formulas coincide with those introduced in [7] .
We classify the frame conditions characterizing intermediate logics into a hierarchy which intuitively accounts for the difficulty to deal proof theoretically with the corresponding formulas of first-order classical logic. As for the substructural hierarchy in [5] (see Section 3) the classification is based on the invertibility of the logical/quantifier rules of the base calculus, which in our case is LK', i.e., a variant of Gentzen LK calculus for first-order classical logic in which all logical rules are invertible, while the universal (existential) quantifier is invertible on the right (respectively on the left). W.l.o.g. we will consider formulas in prenex form. The class to which a formula belongs is determined by the alternation of universal and existential quantifiers in the prefix. The resulting classification is essentially the arithmetical hierarchy. -if A is classically equivalent to ∃xB where B ∈ Π n then A ∈ Σ n+1 -if A is classically equivalent to ∀xB where B ∈ Σ n then A ∈ Π n+1
Example 3. Universal axioms are in Π 1 , while geometric formulas are in Π 2 .
We show below how to transform all formulas within the class Π 2 into structural labelled rules that preserve cut-elimination once added to (a slightly modified version of) G3I. The resulting rules are equivalent to the corresponding axioms, that is, LK' extended with the defined rules or LK' extended with the original formula proves the same sequents.
As for the algorithm in [5, 6] (see Remark 1), the key ingredients for our transformation are: (1) the invertibility in LK' of the rules R∀ (i.e. introduction of ∀ on the right) and L∃ (i.e. introduction of ∃ on the left) and of all logical rules; (2) the following lemma that allows formulas to change the side of the (labelled) sequent going from the conclusion to the premises. h (eigenvariable condition). We distinguish two cases according to whether F contains at least one existential quantifier (F ∈ Π 2 ) or it does not (F ∈ Π 1 ).
Assume that l = 0 (F ∈ Π 1 ). By the invertibility of R∨, R∧ and R¬, ⇒ A ′ is equivalent to a set of atomic sequents P ⇒ Q with P , Q multisets of relational atoms P ir , Q is . By Lemma 3, these sequents are equivalent to rules of the form
Assume that l > 0 (F ∈ Π 2 ). By Lemma 3, ⇒ ∃yA ′ is equivalent to 
The resulting rules are equivalent to F.
Remark 2. The (Π 2 ) rule (which is, in fact, a rule schema) is invertible. To make (Π ′ 1 ) invertible we simply repeat P in its premises, thus obtaining
which is interderivable with the rule (Π ′ 1 ) in LK'. Observe that while (Π 1 ) coincides with the rule defined in [7] for universal axioms, this is not the case for geometric formulas. Indeed the above procedure applied to a geometric formula generates a rule of the form (Π 2 ) which might contain relational atoms (P i1 , . . . , P im ) on the right hand side of premises and is therefore not of the form (geom) [7] . Being geometric formulas Π 2 formulas of a particular shape, we show below that the (Π 2 ) rules for them (generated by Th. 5) can be easily transformed into rules with no relational atom on the right hand side; the resulting rules are nothing but the (geom) rules in [7] .
Corollary 1. Geometric axioms are equivalent to rules of the form (geom).
Proof. Geometric axioms are formulas in Π 2 of the form ∀x∃yA G , where
The claim follows by showing that (Π ′ 2 ) can be transformed into a rule
where each Q i is a multiset of Q i1 , . . . , Q i k . Observe that (Π G 2 ) is nothing but a (geom) rule [7] . To derive (Π G 2 ) we use (Π ′ 2 ) and m initial sequents:
To derive (Π ′ 2 ) we first apply (Π G Rules for non-geometric Π 2 formulas manipulate relational atoms in both sides of the sequent. We show below that this is not an obstacle for obtaining admissibility results analogous to those in Theorem 4. The base calculus we will work with is a slightly modified version of G3I which is obtained by adding initial sequents of the form x y, Γ ⇒ ∆, x y to G3I. Note that these sequents, which are needed for our completeness proof (Theorem 6), were first introduced for G3I and later removed as they were not needed in the labelled systems for intermediate logics presented in [7] ; the reason being that in these systems no rule contains atoms x y in the succedent.
Henceforth we denote by G3SI * (super-intuitionistic) the system obtained by adding to our base calculus rules of the form (Π 1 ) and (Π 2 ) defined by applying Theorem 5 to the set * of formulas within the class Π 2 .
Consider the following version of the structural rules for contraction and weakening (Z is either a labelled formula u : ϕ or a relational atom x y):
y : ψ is in Γ. By inductive hypothesis y ϕ or y ψ, and since x y we have x ϕ ⊃ ψ in the model. If x : ϕ ⊃ ψ is in ∆, at next step of the reduction tree we have that x y and y : ϕ are in Γ, whereas y : ψ is in ∆. By inductive hypothesis this gives x y and y ϕ but y ψ, i.e. x ϕ ⊃ ψ.
Theorem 7 (Cut elimination). The cut rule (Z is either
Proof. We distinguish two cases according to the cut formula Z. When Z is a labelled formula u : ϕ, the proof has the same structure of the cut elimination proof in [7] for G3I extended with rules of the form (geom). It proceeds by a double induction on the complexity of the cut formula and on the sum of the derivation heights of the premises of cut. We observe that the additional initial sequents, i.e. x y, Σ ⇒ Π, x y, make no trouble as Z belongs to Σ ⇒ Π. Moreover, cuts can be permuted upward over any structural rule (Π 1 ) and (Π 2 ).
To avoid clashes with the variable conditions when permuting a cut with (Π 2 ) (or with R ⊃) an appropriate substitution (Lemma 4.1) is used. When Z is a relational atom x y the proof proceeds by induction on the derivation height of the right premises of cut, i.e. Γ ⇒ ∆, x y. The base case is when this is initial; then it is either (i) u v, u : p, Γ ′′ ⇒, ∆ ′′ , v : p, x y; or (ii) u v, Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆ ′′ , u v, x y; or else (iii) x y, Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆, x y. If (i) or (ii), the conclusion of cut is initial. Otherwise, if (iii), the conclusion of cut is obtained by weakening (Lemma 4.2). Assume that Γ ⇒ ∆, x y is not initial and that R is the last rule applied to derive it. We reason by cases according to R and show that the cut can be shifted upwards over the premise(s) of R. The key observation is that x y is left unchanged by the application of R as no rule of G3SI * changes the relational atoms appearing on the right hand side of its conclusion. If R is a logical rule other than R ⊃ or a rule following the (Π 2 ) scheme then cut is simply permuted upwards with R. For instance let R be (Π 1 ); then the derivation Q 1 , . . . , Q m , P 1 , . . . , P n , Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆, x y P 1 , . . . , P n , Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆, x y If R is a rule with variable condition as R ⊃ or a rule following the (Π 2 ) scheme then we need first to replace the eigenvariable in the premise(s) of R and then permute cut and R. Note that the permutation with a R ⊃ rule is not problematic as the cut formula x y on the right hand side always belongs to the context of the rule (i.e., to the ∆ in the rule schemas in Table 1 ).
Open Problems: (1) Characterize the class of axioms that can be transformed into equivalent hypersequent logical rules (Section 3.1 shows a particular axiom for which this is the case) and define an algorithm for the transformation. Note that when defining logical rules the cut-admissibility of the resulting calculus needs either an ad-hoc syntactic proof or suitable semantic methods as in [12] .
(2) Are there intermediate logics characterized by frame conditions that are Π 2 formulas not equivalent to any geometric formula?
(3) Not all frame conditions are formulas within the class Π 2 . As shown in [4] , all axiomatizable intermediate logics are definable by canonical formulas that are in the class N 3 of the substructural hierarchy (cf. Sec. 3). In light of this result, which is the maximum nesting of quantifiers occurring in formulas defining frame conditions for intermediate logics? How to capture all 4 these formulas?
